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Abstract
Most works on adversarial examples for deep-
learning based image classifiers use noise that,
while small, covers the entire image. We explore
the case where the noise is allowed to be visible
but confined to a small, localized patch of the im-
age, without covering any of the main object(s) in
the image. We show that it is possible to generate
localized adversarial noises that cover only 2%
of the pixels in the image, none of them over the
main object, and that are transferable across im-
ages and locations, and successfully fool a state-
of-the-art Inception v3 model with very high suc-
cess rates.
Padlock (92.7%) Tiger Cat (94.4%)
Car Mirror (94.5%) Stingray (90.5%)
1. Adversarial Noise
Deep neural-network architectures achieve remarkable re-
sults on image classification tasks. However, they are also
susceptible to being fooled by adversarial examples: input
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instances which were modified in a particular way, and as a
result, are misclassified by the network. Of course, for the
adversarial example to be interesting, the change should be
such that it does not confuse a human looking at the picture.
Beyond the clear security implications, adversarial exam-
ples are also interesting as they may provide insights into the
strengths, weaknesses, and blind-spots of these ubiquitous
state-of-the-art classification models.
Most work on generating adversarial examples (we provide
a more detailed review in section 5) focus either on noise
which—while being imperceptible to humans—covers the
entire image (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Szegedy et al., 2014),
or on visible noise that covers prominent features of the
main object in the image in a “natural” way (i.e., glasses
with a specific pattern around a person’s eyes in a face
identification task (Sharif et al., 2016)). In contrast, we
look at visible noise that is localized to a small area of the
image (a bounded box with up to 2% of the pixels), and
which does not cover the main object in the image. Figure 1
shows examples of such noised images that are misclassified
by a state-of-the-art Inception V3 network with very high
confidence.
A recent work by Brown et al (Brown et al., 2017) introduces
a visible noise similar to ours. The works are complemen-
tary to a large extent. Their work focuses on the security im-
plications and attempts to generate universal noise “patches”
that can be physically printed and put on any image, in ei-
ther a black-box (when the attacked network is unknown) or
white-box (when the attacked network is known) setup. As
a consequence, the resulting adversarial patches in (Brown
et al., 2017) are relatively large (in a white-box setup, the
generated noise has to cover about 10% of the image to
be effective in about 90% of the tested conditions, and a
disguised patch has to cover about 35% of the image for a
similar result) and also visually resemble the target class to
some extent. We do not attempt to produce a physical attack
and are more interested in investigating the blind-spots of
state-of-the-art image classifiers, and the kinds of noise that
can cause them to misclassify.
We experiment with two setups: working in the Network
Domain and in the Image Domain. In the network-domain
case, the noise is allowed to take any value and is not re-
stricted to the dynamic range of images. Such noise is akin
to shining a very bright flash-light into someone’s eye. In the
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Quail (99.8%)→ Spiny Lobster (94.6%) Conch (99.4%)→ Go-Kart (98.1%)
Lifeboat (89.2%)→ Scotch Terrier (99.8%) Submarine (98.9%)→ Bonnet (99.1%)
Figure 1. Images with network-domain localized noise. The Noise was generated for a specific input and location. Less than 2% of pixels
are noised. Network-domain noises are scaled to image-domain for presentation.
image-domain case the noise is kept to the dynamic-range
of images.
We show that in a white-box setting, we can generate local-
ized visible noise that can be transferred to almost arbitrary
images, covers only up to 2% of the image, does not cover
any part of the main object in the image and yet manages
to make the network misclassify with very high confidence.
This works both for the network-domain and the image-
domain case, although the success rates are naturally higher
for the network-domain.
Moreover, by inspecting the gradients of the network over
noised images, we show that the network does not usually
identify the noised patch as the main cause of misclassifi-
cation, and in some cases hardly assigns it any blame at all.
The latter is true even in network-domain case. This is in
contrast to the hypothesis posed in (Brown et al., 2017), in
which the noise is said to be “much more salient” to the
neural network than real-world objects.
The localized noises we generate are universal in the sense
that they can be applied to many different images and lo-
cations. However, they are specific to a model they were
trained on (i.e., equivalent to the white-box setups in (Brown
et al., 2017)).
We believe these results highlight an interesting blind-spot
in current state-of-the-art network architectures.
2. Localized noise for a single image and
location
In the first setup, we explore generating a visible but local-
ized adversarial noise that is specific to a single image and
location within this image.
2.1. Setting and Method
Our method mostly follows that standard adversarial noise
generation setup: we assume access to a trained model M
that assigns membership probabilities pM (y|x) to input im-
ages x ∈ Rn=w×h×c. We denote by ~y = pM (x) the vector
of all class probabilities, and by y = argmaxy′ pM (y =
y′|x) the highest scoring class for input x (the classifier’s
prediction). Let ysource be the classifier’s prediction on input
x (the source class). We seek an image x′ that is classified
by the network as ytarget (the target class). The image x′
is composed of the original image with an additive noise
δ ∈ Rn: x′ = x+ δ.
This is cast an optimization problem, seeking a value δ to to
maximize pM (y = ytarget|x+ δ). The noise δ can be found
using a stochastic gradient based algorithm.
We depart from this standard methodology by:
1. We want the noise δ to be confined to a small area over
the image x, and to replace this area rather than be
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added to it. This is achieved by setting a mask m ∈
{0, 1}n, and taking the noised image to be (1−m)
x−m δ, where  is element-wise multiplication.
2. Instead of training the noise to either maximize the
probability of the target class or to minimize the prob-
ability of any other class (including the source class),
we use a loss that does both things—it attempts to
move the prediction towards the target class and away
from the highest scored class. We use the network
activations prior to the final softmax layer, denoted as
M(x), M(y = y′|x). This decouples the outputs for
the different classes, and speeds up convergence.
argmax
δ
[M(y = ytarget|(1−m) x+m δ)
−M(y = ysource|(1−m) x+m δ)]
(1)
Network vs Image domain Pixels values in each channel
can take byte values (0-255), which are scaled floats in
the range [0,1] when used as input to the network. We
experiment with two noising setups: network domain and
image domain. In the network domain case, the noise values
is not restricted, and can go beyond the [0,1] dynamic range
of the network. In the image domain case, the noise is
restricted to be within 0 and 1. To facilitate image domain
noises, we clip the noise patch to the range [0,1] after each
gradient step.
The entire process is detailed in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Localized Noising Process
Input: image x, model pM , target class ytarget, target
probability s, mask m, noise domain d.
ysource = argmaxy pM (y|x)
δ = ~0
x′ = (1−m) x+m noise
repeat
~y = pM (x
′)
Ltarget = `(~y, ytarget) =M(y = ytarget|x′)
Largmax = `(~y, yargmax) =M(y = yargmax|x′)
∇target = ∂Ltarget∂x
∇argmax = ∂Largmax∂x
δ = δ −  · (∇target −∇argmax)
if d =image domain then
δ = clip(δ, 0, 1)
end if
x′ = (1−m) x+m δ
until pM (y = ytarget|x′) ≥ s
2.2. Experiments and Results
We use the PyTorch provided pre-trained Inception V3 net-
work (Szegedy et al., 2016) trained on ImageNet. We use im-
ages of size 299x299 and noise a square patch of size 42x42,
roughly 2% of the image pixels. We generate network-
domain noise this way for 100 random (image, target-class,
location) triplets. The location is chosen around the corners
(we focus on the corners as they have the most chance of
not covering the main object of the image). We consider
the noising process successful if the network classifies the
noised image to the desired target class with a confidence
of at least 90%. For each image, we train the noise until we
reach the desired confidence, or up to 10,000 iterations.
We managed to successfully generate localized network-
domain noise this way to 79% of the 110 configurations we
tried. When relaxing the requirement such that the network
chooses the target class as the argmax (but perhaps with
less than 90% probability), we manage to noise 91% of the
configurations. By further relaxing the criteria to classify to
any class other than the source one, noising success reaches
98%. Figure 1 shows examples of such noised images.
Because network-domain noises are outside of the the range
of valid pixels, we normalize the displayed noise patch to
image range for visualization purposes.
2.3. Shortcomings
While we managed to produce a high confidence, targeted
localized noise to 75 out of 100 (image, target-class, loca-
tion) triplets we tried, the resulting noise is highly dependent
on the exact image and location: attempts to shift the noise
even a single pixel to either direction results in the network
classifying to the original class with high confidence. Sim-
ilarly, attempts to move the noise to a different image fail,
unless we transfer, together with the noise, also a border of
about 25% pixels to each side of the source image. In the
next section, we generate noise that can be moved across
images and locations.
3. Transferable localized noise
We now explore transferable (“universal”) localized noises:
a noise patch which can be applied across different images
and image positions.
3.1. Method
We extend the localized noising process in Algorithm 1 by
choosing, at each iteration, a random image x from a “train-
ing set” of 100 images, and a random location. We adjust
the noise vector and the mask so that they correspond to the
target location, apply the noise to the image, and take a gra-
dient step over the noise away from the source class of x and
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Mailbox (99.9%)→ Tiger Cat (91.8%) African-Elephant (92.8%)→ Baseball (90.7%) Sports Car (92.8%)→ Shih-Tzu (90.7%)
Daisy (95.6%)→ Tree Frog (96.4%) Brown Bear (87.9%)→ Tree Frog (82.7%) Minivan (90.7%)→ Tree Frog (86.4%)
Figure 2. Transferable localized noises (network domain). Different network-domain noise patches, any of them can work on different
images and locations. Notice that the same patch was used for all three images in the second row. The noises are scaled to image domain
for visualization purposes.
Gong (89.3%)→ Jaguar (96.4%) Mantis (96.8%)→ Cock (71.8%) Brown Bear (92.5%)→ Baseball (96.4%)
Figure 3. Transferable localized noises (image domain).
towards the shared target class ytarget. Thus, at each iteration
the same noise is applied on a random image and location,
both sampled separately from uniform distributions of the
possible images and locations respectively. This is very
similar to the algorithm presented in (Brown et al., 2017),
with a somewhat different loss function, as described above.
We stop the noise generation process after the prediction
model misclassifies with the desired confidence (i.e. Target
class probability ≥ 0.9) for 30 consecutive iterations.
3.2. Experiments and Results
Overall we generated transferable noise patches for 14 dif-
ferent targets. The generated noises are presented in Figure
4, both for image domain noise patches and network domain
patches (rescaled to image range for visualization purposes).
Network Domain We first provide anecdotal results of
applying a trained noise to unseen images: Figure 2 shows
some examples of images with transferable noises in the
network domain.
To assess the robustness to location, we applied a noise
patch striding across every second pixel in an image that did
not participate in the noise generation process, evaluating
the model’s prediction at each location using the following
metrics: (1) probability of predicting the source class; (2)
probability of predicting the target class; (3) argmax indica-
tion (i.e whether the class received the highest probability
among other class) for the target class, source class, or nei-
ther classes. Figure 5 shows the result of this process for the
(image:Gondola, target:Volcano) pair.
As can be seen, the noise is very robust, reducing the source
class probability to near 0 across the image, and similarly
increasing the target class probability.
We repeated this process for each of the 14 targets and each
of the 100 images in our test set. On average, applying the
transferable noise to 83% of the possible locations caused
the target class to receive a score ≥ 0.9, and in 97% of the
locations it caused the model to not predict the original-
source class.
To evaluate the noise’s transferability across images, we
used a separate test set, consisting of 100 images from
the ImageNet data-set that did not participate in the noise
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Network-Domain Image-Domain Network-Domain Image-Domain Network-Domain Image-Domain Network-Domain Image-Domain
Baseball Cock iPod Jaguar
Kite Milk Can Mitten Monitor
Muzzle Rock Beaut Rock Beauty Tree Frog
Volcano Vulture
Figure 4. Network and image domain transferable localized noises for different target classes. Network domain noises were rescaled to
image range for display purposes. Note that for many of the classes the resulting noises, and in particular the image-domain ones, contain
prominent features of the target class like fur, eyes and global shape, and resembles a miniature version of the target class to some extent.
generation process. We placed each transferable noise patch
on each image on the bottom right corner. Though only
43% of our attempts made the model predict the target class
with confidence ≥ 0.9, in 89% of the cases it predicted the
desired target as the most likely one, and in 100% of the
cases, the transferable noise patches prevented the model
from predicting the original source class.
Image Domain We evaluate the performance of the im-
age domain noises using the same 100 images used in the
network-domain evaluation. The success rates are somewhat
lower, but still effective: while only 28.3% of the attempts
made the model predict the target class with confidence ≥
0.9, in 74.1% of the cases it caused the model to predict the
target class as the most likely one, and in 78.9% it resulted
in a misclassification of the source class. Figure 3 shows
some examples of transferable image-domain noises.
Class dependence We now ask the following question:
are specific classes better at serving as “target” classes, mak-
ing it easier to fool the network when using them? Con-
versely we ask, are particular source classes harder such
that attempting to apply noise patches them results in less
success?
Figure 8 summarizes the dependence of the noising process
success on the source and target class using image domain
noises. Each cell shows the success rate of the noising pro-
cess when using source images from “source” class and
using “target” as the target. As can be seen there are sig-
nificant differences between the different classes. Since we
only cover a small subset of all possible classes in ImageNet
we can only postulate that more globally structured classes
such as “volcano” are more challenging to this localized
process than locally structured classes as ”baseball”.
4. Noise perceived by the network
We successfully generated small transferable, localized
noise patches that fool a state-of-the-art network into mis-
classifying an example.
In (Brown et al., 2017), the authors suggest that the localized
noise works because it is much more salient than natural
looking objects in the scene, capturing all of the network’s
attention. To try and examine this claim, we take some
noised images and attempt to “fix” the effect of the noise on
the classification output.
First, we attempt to fix a noised image by feeding it into
the network and taking gradient steps over the entire im-
age towards the original source class.1 For example, we
take a noised image of a Killer Whale classified as a
Baseball, and take gradient steps over the entire image
until it is classified as a Killer Whale. The top image
1This is similar to the salience map computation in (Simonyan
et al., 2013), but we accumulate the absolute values of several
gradient steps, until reaching the desired outcome.
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Clean Image Predicted Probability for Source Class (Gondola) Predicted Probability for Target Class (Volcano)
(Gondola) Blue: 0, Red: 1 Blue: 0, Red: 1
Yellow: Argmax is neither Gondola nor Volcano Yellow: Argmax is Source Class (Gondola) Yellow: Argmax is Target Class (Volcano)
Blue: Argmax either Gondola or Volcano Blue: Argmax is some other class Blue: Argmax is some other class
Figure 5. Result of placing the Volcano network-domain noise patch on different locations in the Gondola image
Figure 6. Gradient updates required to fix the Baseball (86%)
(Top, Network Domain) and Jaguar (82%) (Bottom, Image Do-
main) misclassifications back to Dolphin and Uniform. In
both cases, the noised area in both cases is well represented in the
gradients, but is not the most salient area.
triplet in Figure 6 visualizes the gradient fix for the whale
image. The center image shows the absolute values of the
cumulative updates that were needed to overcome the noise
and re-classify as a Whale. Notice that while a lot of the
gradient efforts are within the noise patch, there is also a
lot of activity outside of the patch, accenting features of the
Whale’s body.
What if instead of attempting to optimize towards the source
class, we optimize the noised image away from the target
Figure 7. Gradient updates required to fix the iPod (98%) (Top,
Network Domain) and the Tree-frog (80%) (Bottom, Image
Domain) misclassifications. Noised area in both cases is mostly
ignored in the gradients.
class? I.e., rather than pushing the noised image to “be a
whale again”, we push it to “stop being a baseball”? The
resulting cumulative gradients are displayed on the top im-
ages in Figure 6 (whale image triplet). We see less gradient
activity overall, and, somewhat surprisingly, there again
seems to be at least as much activity outside the noise patch
as it is within it. This gradient behavior persists on different
image/noise cases, with a combination of gradient within
the noise box and outside of is.
Some noise cases are more intriguing. For example, the
LaVAN: Localized and Visible Adversarial Noise
Target Class
baseball cock iPod jaguar kite milk-can mitten monitor muzzle rock beauty tiger-cat tree-frog volcano vulture
academic gown 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
banana 0.98 0.70 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.29 0.96 0.32 0.99 0.72 0.71 0.96 0.06 0.91
barbershop 0.99 0.92 0.34 0.93 0.89 0.63 0.91 0.50 0.98 0.69 0.78 0.95 0.22 0.89
bee 0.99 0.79 0.81 0.88 0.85 0.20 0.71 0.12 0.93 0.70 0.68 0.96 0.12 0.91
bell pepper 0.94 0.48 0.19 0.73 0.66 0.50 0.53 0.04 0.12 0.53 0.61 0.89 0.05 0.90
garden spider 0.97 0.66 0.10 0.95 0.89 0.46 0.19 0.22 0.99 0.84 0.83 0.96 0.05 0.71
book jacket 0.99 0.77 0.15 0.81 0.90 0.83 0.45 0.27 0.99 0.90 0.84 0.97 0.08 0.96
brown bear 0.80 0.21 0.13 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.21 0.02 0.50 0.19 0.32 0.55 0.01 0.28
bullet train 0.98 0.47 0.01 0.79 0.61 0.54 0.65 0.20 0.69 0.40 0.74 0.88 0.05 0.49
cardigan 0.94 0.51 0.25 0.77 0.66 0.18 0.55 0.17 0.93 0.29 0.56 0.71 0.15 0.45
corn 0.99 0.76 0.63 0.96 0.97 0.89 0.90 0.05 1.00 0.81 0.72 0.95 0.33 0.98
crash helmet 0.98 0.50 0.10 0.79 0.80 0.22 0.41 0.05 0.58 0.46 0.58 0.92 0.02 0.41
daisy 0.96 0.51 0.39 0.77 0.73 0.71 0.66 0.33 0.87 0.62 0.65 0.90 0.13 0.72
dishrag 0.97 0.67 0.06 0.90 0.95 0.52 0.63 0.02 0.95 0.67 0.73 0.92 0.10 0.92
dogsled 0.93 0.44 0.14 0.48 0.62 0.60 0.25 0.02 0.49 0.27 0.44 0.70 0.07 0.32
electric ray 0.98 0.77 0.15 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.89 0.14 0.99 0.84 0.73 0.95 0.13 0.98
football helmet 0.96 0.61 0.01 0.65 0.77 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.16 0.41 0.50 0.84 0.00 0.66
gong 0.95 0.36 0.03 0.84 0.71 0.11 0.42 0.02 0.50 0.28 0.72 0.75 0.01 0.37
green mamba 0.92 0.23 0.11 0.56 0.55 0.35 0.25 0.10 0.81 0.35 0.53 0.43 0.04 0.36
hatchet 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
hip 0.98 0.65 0.41 0.95 0.82 0.95 0.96 0.29 0.99 0.80 0.79 0.83 0.20 0.59
S
ou
rc
e
C
la
ss
hummingbird 1.00 0.61 0.66 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.69 0.57 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.97 0.19 0.94
Indian cobra 0.96 0.29 0.30 0.76 0.64 0.36 0.14 0.16 0.87 0.60 0.59 0.77 0.05 0.64
iPod 0.99 0.79 1.00 0.96 0.88 0.10 0.45 0.10 0.94 0.80 0.89 0.93 0.13 0.94
jellyfish 0.99 0.52 0.75 0.91 0.87 0.93 0.56 0.31 0.96 0.84 0.89 0.94 0.05 0.89
lacewing 0.93 0.33 0.05 0.72 0.73 0.20 0.24 0.02 0.90 0.17 0.36 0.46 0.05 0.15
mailbag 0.84 0.23 0.02 0.44 0.60 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.69 0.02 0.68 0.73 0.02 0.05
mantis 0.94 0.47 0.27 0.71 0.66 0.27 0.35 0.19 0.59 0.39 0.67 0.73 0.10 0.59
military uniform 0.97 0.82 0.15 0.90 0.87 0.69 0.90 0.33 0.97 0.68 0.67 0.90 0.21 0.82
minivan 0.98 0.87 0.13 0.92 0.91 0.76 0.95 0.09 1.00 0.78 0.80 0.97 0.09 0.92
mortarboard 0.97 0.48 0.24 0.60 0.66 0.10 0.55 0.07 0.66 0.36 0.51 0.67 0.06 0.56
poncho 0.99 0.89 0.51 0.92 0.93 0.37 0.93 0.18 1.00 0.78 0.88 0.95 0.05 0.92
rapeseed 0.99 0.71 0.51 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.96 0.27 1.00 0.86 0.75 0.94 0.38 0.83
starfish 0.99 0.82 0.69 0.95 0.77 0.50 0.86 0.17 0.99 0.82 0.74 0.98 0.07 0.95
turnstile 0.99 0.78 0.01 0.93 0.74 0.50 0.56 0.02 0.96 0.23 0.72 0.94 0.05 0.73
velvet 0.98 0.66 0.19 0.91 0.90 0.61 0.86 0.04 1.00 0.63 0.49 0.92 0.11 0.82
walking stick 0.97 0.40 0.54 0.79 0.78 0.54 0.54 0.27 0.67 0.59 0.76 0.84 0.10 0.69
washer 0.98 0.64 0.17 0.90 0.78 0.51 0.78 0.25 0.93 0.61 0.80 0.93 0.07 0.66
water snake 0.99 0.75 0.59 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.86 0.22 1.00 0.89 0.69 0.95 0.28 0.96
wing 0.99 0.81 0.50 0.93 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.27 0.96 0.94 0.74 0.93 0.49 0.99
Figure 8. Average target score heatmap for transferable image-domain noises. The value in Ci,j is the average score assigned to the target
class j when that the source class is i.
top image triplet in Figure 7 shows the case of a Sports
Car being noised to a iPod at 98%. When driving the
image towards Sports Car (center), the gradient seem
to accent the car’s front and its surrounding, while almost
completely ignoring the noised patch. In order to restore
the original class, the network’s gradients work to enhance
features of the original class rather than diminishing the
intruding noise. This pattern persists when optimizing the
noised image away from iPod (right): there are hardly any
updates within the noised area. The stealthiness of the noise
is observed both in network-domain noises (Fig 7 top) and
in image-domain noises (Fig 7 bottom).
This suggests that, at least in some image/noise combina-
tions, the localized visible noise is not only very effective at
misleading the classifier and triggering the target class, it is
also quite stealthy–at least according to the target gradients
wrt to the image, the classifier attributes the target to various
elements in the image, but not to the noisy patch itself. This
is contrast to previous suggestions that noise is somehow
more salient to the network than other parts of the image.
4.1. Quantifying the saliency of noise
To further quantify the above behavior, we consider the
gradients required to fix the 2,800 noised images that result
from applying each of the 28 noises in Figure 4 to the bottom
right corner of each of the 100 test images.
In each gradient-fix map, we score each 42x42 patch accord-
ing to: (1) the maximum absolute value within the patch
(MAX); and (2) the sum of the absolute values within the
patch (SUM). We then take the patch with the maximum
value according to each metric, and check if it overlaps with
the noise location. Table 1 lists the results. According to
both metrics, the most active patch very rarely overlaps with
the noise location. This strengthens our previous claim and
suggests that the model may fail to understand and locate
the noise in the image.
Domain Fix method MAX SUM
Network Towards Source 0.4% 0.15%
Network Away from Target 0.5% 0.13%
Image Towards Source 0.6% 5.4%
Image Away from Target 0.7& 5.2%
Table 1. Quantifying the saliency of transferable noises. Each cell
lists the percent of out of 1,400 (images,target) pairs in which the
most active 42x42 gradient-fix patch ovelaps with the 42x42 noise
patch. MAX: active patches are selected according to the max
value in the patch. SUM: selected according to sum of values in
the patch.
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5. Related Work
Most works focus on adding a small amount of noise, im-
perceptible to the human eye, but covering the entire image.
It was shown that it is possible to construct such noises to
thwart multiclass image classifiers (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Szegedy et al., 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), and,
more recently, also structured classifiers in tasks such as
image segmentation and pose estimation (Cisse et al., 2017).
In all these cases the noise covers the entire image, includ-
ing the salient objects within it. We focus on cases where
the noise may be larger, but only affect a small part of the
image.
Several works explore setups that do not noise the entire
image. Sharif et al (Sharif et al., 2016) causes a face recog-
nition system to identify an incorrect face by adding glasses
with a specially constructed frame texture, and Evtimov et
al (Evtimov et al., 2017) causes misclassification of traf-
fic signs by adding a specific pattern of rectangular, solid-
colored patches on top of a traffic sign. These are very
impressive works in which the attack transfers to images
taken in the real world. However, from the noise locality
perspective, in both these cases, the noise patches attack
very prominent characteristics of the objects to be classified.
The glasses hide areas around the eyes, which are very in-
dicative for face recognition. Similarly, many traffic signs
can be abstracted as a specific arrangement of solid-colored
rectangles on a solid-colored background, so it is not too
surprising that messing with the rectangles formation can
fool a traffic-sign classifier. Su et al (Su et al., 2017) demon-
strate that, in about 70% of 32x32 images from CIFAR-10,
it is possible to find a single pixel whose change in value
can cause a misclassification (the number drops to between
20% and 30% for a targeted attack towards a specific target
class). However, this requires a very small image size, and
the offending pixel usually at the center of the classified im-
age. Papernot et al (Papernot et al., 2016) show that, when
considering black-and-white digits classification, changing
a small percentage of pixels from black to white can cause
misclassification. The pixels are spread out across the entire
image and look as harming noise to a human observer.
In contrast to all these works, in our case, the pixels are
localized to a specific region of the image and do not cover
the source-class object at all. Finally, the recent adversar-
ial patch work by Brown et al (Brown et al., 2017) is very
similar to our setting, and was discussed throughout this
report. They focus on printable patches that are immune
to scaling or ration, and that can be used for physical at-
tacks. As a consequence, their patches are required to be
very large, covering upward from 10% of the image in order
to be effective. We demonstrate that, when relaxing these
requirements, networks can be fooled also by much smaller
patches of visible noise, that cover a substantially smaller
area of the image. Moreover, we show that—at least ac-
cording to its gradients—the network does not recognize
the attacking patches as the source of the misclassification.
6. Conclusions
We show that it is possible to learn visible and localized
adversarial noise patches that cover only 2% of the pixels
in the image, none of them on the main salient object, and
that cause a state-of-the-art image classifier to misclassify to
arbitrary labels. Such noise patches are not image specific,
and the same patch can be applied to arbitrary images and
locations, causing a misclassification to the desired target
class with very high success rates. Perhaps surprisingly, in
many cases, the noise patch is not particularly salient as
far as the network is concerned as revealed by the resulting
gradients when one attempts to “fix” the noise effect.
The resulting noise patches resemble the target classes both
in the network domain and image domain cases. Prominent
features such as texture and fur, body parts like eyes and
beaks and global shape characteristics are all reflected in
the outputs. The noise patch—however similar to the target
class—is still much smaller than main object in the image,
yet makes the network misclassify.
Furthermore, and somewhat surprisingly when considering
that the input patch lies pretty close to stimuli the network
usually observes (certainly in the image domain case), the
gradients when attempting to revert the noise tell us that
the noised patch is not very salient to the network when
compared to other locations within the image.
Considering the noised patch is not salient to the network
raises some concerns from a security perspective, but also
raises some interesting questions about the inner workings
of the network. From a security perspective, such a noise
patch is problematic as it seems that the network does not
“see” that is being fooled, possibly making it hard protect
against such attacks. This is true both for the image domain
and network domain noise. From a scientific perspective
we feel the methods and results presented here may serve
as the foundation of some interesting future research. The
brittleness of the classification output of these networks tells
us something about the way they operate. One could ask
whether different architecture are susceptible to such attacks
in different ways and whether specific architectural choices
affect the resulting vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it raises the
question whether during training we can try to make these
systems more robust, incorporating adversarial auxiliary
losses into the training pipeline and making the networks
more robust. These are all left for future research.
LaVAN: Localized and Visible Adversarial Noise
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